ABSTRACT
Genellikle insanlar doğumdan itibaren toplumsal cinsiyet rollerine maruz kalarak ilerleyen yaşantılarında bu roller doğrultusunda tüketim tercihlerini ve kararlarını belirlemeye çalışmaktadır. Toplumdan topluma değişen skonusu bu roller, kişilerin vereceği tüketim kararlarında etkili bir pozisyonda yer almasını sağlayabilir. Ancak daha önce yapılmış çalışmalar, küresel bir şokun tüketimler üzerinde bireylerin benzer tüketim tercihlerinde bulunulduğunu göstermiştir. Bu bağlamda çalışmanın amacı Covid-19 salgını ile birlikte toplumun cinsiyetlere yüklediği rollere ait tüketim kalıplarının genç yetişkinler üzerindeki değişiminin ne şekilde yaşandığını ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Araştırma yöntemi olarak nitel araştırma tekniklerinden derinlemesine mülakat tekniği kullanılmıştır. Çalışma kapsamında Muğla Sıtkı Koçman Üniversitesi Íktisadi ve Ídari Bilimler Fakültesi bünyesinde yer alan bölümlerdeki (işletme, iktisat, kamu yönetimi, siyaset bilimleri ve uluslararası ilişkiler) 40 öğrenci ile bu görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Sonuç olarak küresel salgınla birlikte toplumsal cinsiyet algısına aykırı satın alımlar gerçekleştiren katılımcıların son derece az oluşu hatta genç yetişkinlerin büyük çoğunluğunun toplumsal cinsiyete bağlı tüketim yapmadıkları ve buna karşı oldukları ortaya çıkmıştır.Alternate :People are often exposed to gender roles from birth to determine consumption preferences and decisions in line with these roles in their future lives. These roles, which have changed from society to society, can enable people to take an effective position in the decisions of consumption. However, previous studies have shown that individuals have similar consumption preferences on the consumption of a global shock.In this context, the aim of the study is to demonstrate the way that the consumption patterns of the roles that society has put into the gender, along with the Covid-19 epidemic, have changed on young adults. In-depth interview technique from qualitative research techniques was used as a method of research. These meetings were held with 40 students in the departments of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences (business, economics, public administration, political sciences and international relations) of Muğla Sitki Kocman University within the scope of the study. As a result, participants who have made procurement against the perception of gender with the global outbreak have been extremely low, and even the majority of young adults have shown that they do not consume and oppose gender-dependent consumption.
ABSTRACT
Joint decision-making processes such as negotiations play a vital role in diverse societal contexts spanning from business and politics to sustainability-related negotiations. One of the most prominent examples of how negotiations play an important role in overcoming societal challenges was the COVID-19 vaccine supply negotiations. These negotiations have put the spotlight on an aspect of joint decision-making that always has been of great interest to both negotiation researchers and practitioners yet remains empirically understudied- the effect of uncertainty. In the present article, we develop a framework of uncertainty in negotiation using the COVID-19 vaccine supply negotiations between the European Union and pharmaceutical companies as an example. More specifically, we categorize different kinds of uncertainty based both on mathematical considerations (i.e., differentiation between risk, ambiguity, and uncertainty) as well as on more circumstantial factors. To do so, we adapted the nine kinds of uncertainty in environmental governance proposed by Dewulf and Biesbroek to the more general context of negotiations. We first differentiate between three natures of uncertainty (i.e., lack of knowledge, unpredictability, and interpretations) and three objects of uncertainty (i.e., issue- based, strategy- based, and context- based). Second, we illustrate the psychological barriers that negotiators face when handling uncertainty, before concluding with proposals for practitioners on how to manage different kinds of uncertainty. Overall, we aim at stimulating investigations of the effects of uncertainty in mixed- motive decision- making while simultaneously helping negotiation teachers and practitioners better cope with the additional demands created by specific kinds of uncertainty.
ABSTRACT
In 2022–2023, China is entering a new stage of its development. The combination of a number of crisis-con-taining factors increases the likelihood of a large-scale socio-economic shock. Partly man-made excessive slowdown in economic development due to the "Zero COVID policy”, the ongoing and escalating US-Chinese rivalry and, in particular, the "technological war”, the over-concentration of power after the 20th Congress of the CPC, as well as the growing tension around the Taiwan problem – all together, or with the imposition of just two or three components, can lead to serious negative socio-economic consequences that will put into question Beijing's achievement of its second "centennial goal” – the establishment of the PRC as one of the leading world powers by 2049. With the exception of the domestic political sphere, China is trying to find answers to the above-mentioned challenges. In late 2022 – early 2023, Beijing removes anti-coronavirus restrictions, activates trade and economic cooperation in various formats, attempts to find out common ground between Chinese and American global interests, continues to make efforts in the European (also African, Asian, etc.) direction of its foreign policy, as well as emphasizes the high level of Russian-Chinese cooperation. At the same time, trying to provide answers to crisis-containing factors, Beijing faces both opportunities and limitations. The coming year or two seem to be most difficult for China over the last 20 years. The slowdown in the economy and domestic consumption, social protests, new challenges of the pandemic, the search for options to normalize relations with the United States, balancing between the West and Russia against the background of the Ukrainian crisis, etc. will require non-standard solutions from the Chinese leadership. Here we can expect both traditional successes and possible failures. In the near future, the political model chosen by Beijing at the 20th CPC Congress will be tested for effectiveness. © 2023 Vasily V. MIKHEEV.
ABSTRACT
The impacts of the novel coronavirus (hereafter COVID-19) pose one of the greatest crises of our generation. The policy decisions that the US and Chinese governments take will shape the current order of international relations, the global supply chain of medical supplies, and US–China relations. The COVID-19 crisis leads to the empirical puzzles: how do the two great world powers construct their narratives on the global pandemic and toward each other? What are the meanings, if any, of fear in US–China relations? This study explores the narrative of fear that is constituted in the US and China discourse. The historical analogies, such as the Boxer Indemnity, sick man of Asia, and Pearl Harbor attack, offer great examples to the political construction of the "fearful” other through specific representations amid the outbreak of COVID-19. Specifically, they have become the "cultural scripts” that define how they interact and who they are. The article proceeds as follows. First, this study examines the current literature of realism, constructivism, and discourse analysis. Second, it proposes a comparative framework for understanding the expressions of fear and threat perceptions for both countries. Specifically, the "Pearl Harbor Moment” from the US, and "the Boxer Indemnity” from the Chinese government substantially shape the landscape of US–China relations. Third, it highlights how the political elites appropriate these historical analogies in constructing their political identities and offers insights into the future of US–China relations. Finally, this article concludes with thoughts on the studies on the struggle of great powers and implications for pandemic politics.
ABSTRACT
According to the WHO, this virus still exists in many parts of the globe in some form or the other. After the end of the Cold War in the early 90s, the global geopolitical and geo-economic divide, consequent to the ongoing Russo-Ukraine War, has never been so harshly polarised. [...]it is pertinent to note what President Xi had spoken recently in the National People's Congress stating that he will endeavour to "more quickly elevating the armed forces to world-class standards-and make it a great wall of steel." Importantly, for decades, India does carry some moral authority with itself with its foreign policy based on the Nehruvian concept of nonalignment now aptly called 'strategic autonomy' which has been long respected by the 'third world' now referred to as the 'global south'.
ABSTRACT
Gedryf deur die totale koste van eienaarskap, handel en tegnologiemededinging tussen die Verenigde State van Amerika en China, en die COVID-19-pandemie, ondergaan wereldwye voorsieningskettings 'n groot herstrukturering wat binnekort die besigheid en ekonomie oor die hele wereld sal transformeer. Onlangs het voorsieningskettings met end-totend-integrasie vir premium landbouvoedselprodukte as 'n nuwe sakemodel na vore gekom. Hierdie artikel ondersoek hoe hulle moet funksioneer, en identifiseer die voorsieningskettingstruktuur / - produksie / - besigheids toestande wat nodig is vir hul ontwikkeling. Ons bestudeer 'n premium voorsieningsketting wat bestaan uit baie klein plase wat piesangs van topgehalte produseer, een integreerfirma en duisende kleinhandelwinkels. Ons gebruik industrie- en besigheidsdata om 'n meervoudige roete-vloei-gebaseerde model te kalibreer van plase tot integreerder tot kleinhandelaars/markte. Ons gebruik dan sensitiwiteitsanalise om die belanghebbendes se besluitgedrag te analiseer, en identifiseer en bespreek drie hoofbesluitkwessies: kontrakboerdery, kapasiteitstrategie en besigheidsrobuustheid. Vir kontrakspesifikasie is kontraktering op prys, eerder as hoeveelheid, bevorderlik om die belange van die belanghebbendes te koördineer. Vir die kapasiteitstrategie moet die integreerder rou produkte van baie klein plase verkry eerder as minder groot plase. Vir besigheid se robuustheid kan die integreerder steeds robuuste winste verseker deur sy produkaanbod te reguleer wanneer nuwe mededingers ontstaan of vraag verander. Hierdie resultate word onder verskeie scenario's getoets om die impak van insetparameters of voorsieningskettingstruktuur te bepaal, en word geverifieer met 'n bedryfspraktisyn wat ondervinding het met veelvuldige premium agri-voedselprodukte. Die resultate, tesame met die vloeimodel en sy berekeningsprosedure, kan deur voorsieningskettingbeplanners gebruik word om nuwe besighede te begin of om kleinhandelaars se premium produkaanbiedinge in mededingende besigheidsomgewings te onderskei.Alternate :Driven by the total cost of ownership, US-China trade and technology competition, and the COVID-19 pandemic, global supply chains are undergoing a major restructuring that will soon transform business and economics all over the world. Recently, supply chains with end-to-end integration for premium agri-food products have emerged as a new business model. This paper examines how they should function, and identifies the supply chain structure/production/business conditions necessary for their development. We study a premium supply chain consisting of many small farms that produce top-quality bananas, one integrator firm, and thousands of retail stores. We use industry and business data to calibrate a multiple-route flow-based model from farms to integrator to retailers/markets. We then use sensitivity analysis to illuminate the stakeholders' decision behaviour, and identify and discuss three main decision issues: contract farming, capacity strategy, and business robustness. For contract specification, contracting on price rather than quantity is conducive to coordinating the interests of the stakeholders. For the capacity strategy, the integrator should source raw products from many small farms rather than fewer large farms. For business robustness, the integrator could still ensure robust profits by regulating its product supply when new competitors arise or demand changes. These results are tested under various scenarios to determine the impact of input parameters or supply chain structure, and are verified with an industry practitioner who has experience with multiple premium agri-food products. The results, along with the flow model and its computation procedure, could be used by supply chain planners to start new businesses or to differentiate retailers' premium product offerings in competitive business environments.
ABSTRACT
The best way to think about the climate emergency is to imagine humanity has just arrived at a new planet somewhere in a distant galaxy. After all, as scientists tell us, our planet Earth will soon look like a new planet, with conditions radically changed from the 'climate niche' of the past 10,000 years, during which human civilization developed. Once settled on the new planet, our task is to terraform it, to build a new natural environment fit for human life and human flourishing. My general approach to the politics of climate change thus differs from the most common view among environmentalists. I do not believe we can speak of climate change as a product of the Anthropocene, the human-built world. Our inability to control the consequences of climate change shows this is still at heart a natural process, one triggered by human beings or, more specifically, by our limited ability to control natural processes and therefore by our incapacity to control the unintended consequences of our actions and choices. The solution to the climate emergency is not to exit the Anthropocene but, intriguingly, to enter it for the first time. The world building is a task significantly full of existential meaning and urgency.
ABSTRACT
A disclaimer to start with: in a federal union of 1.3 billion persons comprising 17 per cent of humankind, 36 states and territories, multiple languages and ethnic groups, few if any observations are valid across the whole country. Democracies find it hard to make tough decisions and to adapt when they need to improvise without precedents;pre-emption to tackle a problem before it becomes a crisis is never a democratic strength, especially in a federation. India took relatively early steps against Covid-19: visas were rescinded on March 18;international flights stopped on March 22;and domestic flights were terminated on March 24. Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for a 12-h nation-wide voluntary curfew on 22 March, marked with high observance, which was a dress rehearsal for a full lock-down from 24 March for 21 days with relaxations for medicines, media, banks and groceries. The national closure was the most comprehensive in history. At that stage, India had registered 500 cases and 10 deaths. The trade-off was to lose lives to Covid-19, or gain time to prepare health services and risk the economic consequences. Modi acted quickly although it caused hardship to millions. By and large, the lockdown was observed, justifying the theory that Indians react best in emergency mode.
ABSTRACT
Based on 1692 outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) events of 735 A-share listed companies in China's manufacturing industry from 2010 to 2019, this paper empirically examines the effect of investment motivation and the impact of institutional differences between China and the host country on the choice of OFDI entry mode;the paper also investigates the moderating effect of the "Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI) on Chinese manufacturing enterprises (CMEs) through use of the logit model. The empirical results show that, with greater institutional differences, CMEs become more inclined to choose cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Furthermore, a positive moderating effect of resource-seeking motivation on the choice of M&A OFDI by CMEs is observed. The signing of the "Belt and Road” cooperation document positively moderates institutional differences in promoting CMEs—especially state-owned CMEs—to choose the M&A mode. The "Belt and Road” Initiative provides an efficient supply system for OFDI by CMEs. This study enriches and extends existing institutional theories and provides suggestions for the promotion of the geopolitical pattern and international cooperation regarding the "Belt and Road” Initiative.
ABSTRACT
With China and Russia acting more assertively vis-à-vis Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have gradually moved to the core of contemporary Eurasian geopolitics – albeit to varying degrees. The European Union (EU) has purposefully sought to promote its norms and values in the region for quite some time in the past. However, considering the ongoing Western "polycrisis" exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic most recently, our paper investigates how the EU has been recalibrating its relationship towards Central Asia – within the timespan of its two EU Central Asia Strategies, dating from 2007 and 2019, respectively. We argue that the reformulation of EU policy towards Central Asia is pragmatically taking its lead from the growing constraints of EU foreign policy as well as Chinese and Russian intervention in the region;it is, in the end, geographical proximity that continues to shape geopolitics in Central Asia. [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Geopolitics is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)
ABSTRACT
Shanghai and Saint Petersburg are sister cities. Shanghai was the very first sister city of Saint Petersburg in China. The cities are linked by long-term fruitful humanitarian and economic ties. Economic cooperation between the two cities has been and remains one of the priorities of interaction for the development of cities. Saint Petersburg — Shanghai economic cooperation has great potential. The level of cooperation on the range of economic and other issues is constantly expanding, the demand for legal assistance is also increasing, respectively. Therefore, the establishment of the Center of Legal Services Saint Petersburg — Shanghai is of great importance. This Center will be committed to the development and prosperity of the two cities, expanding mutually beneficial trade, economic and investment cooperation, broadening and deepening cooperation ties in various economic sectors, consolidation of legal services resources and establishment of a mechanism for communication and coordination between government departments and enterprises of the two cities, conducting specialized Webinars dedicated to the establishment of the Center of Legal Services Saint Petersburg — Shanghai and various legal topics, publishing a white paper, legal branding, successful holding of the Forum on the legal services of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, strengthening the docking of high-quality projects, creating a new model of economic and trade cooperation, consolidation of the foundation for Sino-Russian economic and trade cooperation, creation of an integrated single digital platform for the exchange of information;information exchange for further discussion of issues of cooperation in such areas of mutual interest as legal control by legislative bodies, prevention and control during the pandemic, trade and economic development and humanitarian exchanges for enterprises of Russia and China, in order to give impetus to the further development of relations between Saint Petersburg and Shanghai as sister cities. © 2023 The Author(s).
ABSTRACT
Despite the challenges, remittances frequently remain a primary source of economic support for those left behind, as well as for national development of post-conflict countries. [...]situations in the wake of recent conflicts are known for heightened remittance flows.3 As a large share of the remittance flows in conflict settings occurs through informal channels, the importance of remittances in these economies has often been underestimated. A focus on broader settings that can provide security, justice, and economic sustenance to individuals and communities affected by the crisis has been reflected in the human security approach6 to post-conflict7 development.8 Remittances can be central to fighting poverty—by diversifying household income sources, providing capital for productive investment and facilitating local markets, and funding education, health, and other social expenses.9 Remittances can contribute to post-conflict recovery in the long term. "20 Horst has shown that among the Somali diaspora in Norway, most political engagements do not occur through state institutions but take place on sub-national levels, including individual and group money transfers and certain humanitarian initiatives.21 Somali diaspora members mediate with clan leaders and elders who can contribute to reconciliation processes through customary mechanisms such as compensatory payments, but as noted above, such involvement can also sustain continued warfare.22 While the role of diaspora in post-conflict reconstruction efforts can be significant, diaspora can also remain an "under-utilized resource" whose strong emotional connection to their home country is offset by unstable institutional environments.23 Weak formal institutions and regulatory frameworks may offer little systematic support for entrepreneurship development, which is constrained by high transaction and compliance costs. Informal institutions and cultural attitudes remain important in the post-conflict assimilation of returning migrants who bring with them beliefs and understandings from their countries of settlement, resulting in hybrid norms and institutions.24 Many forcibly displaced and returning migrants may also lack properly transferable professional skills.25 The transfer of social and political remittances does not always signify "diffusion of democracy"—the effects of returning migrants to democratization depend on their experience of political mobilization as migrant workers, as well as on the status of democratic values in the political order of the host country, among other factors.26 Changing perspectives on conflict-affected remittances Remittances became central in the migration scholarship only in the 1990s, when the analytical focus shifted from migration as a result of [End Page 44] decision-making of rational individuals towards a more nuanced view of the role of households, social networks, and community in migration processes.
ABSTRACT
[...]a broad and inclusive approach to post-pandemic policy-making—one that considers Indigenous forms of knowledge whilst fostering appreciation for their cultures and lives—is needed to adequately assist Indigenous peoples in repairing the harm they have suffered as a result of COVID-19.3 COVID-19 and its deadly impact on Indigenous communities There are no less than eight hundred distinct Indigenous communities across Latin America, each with its own unique identity, culture, and [End Page 169] history. In Bolivia, for example, where Indigenous groups comprise a significant portion of the electorate (between 41 and 62 percent of the population), Latin America's first Indigenous political executive was elected in 2006.4 In most instances, however, Indigenous peoples make up only a small proportion of Latin American country populations (generally ranging from 0.5–15 percent), one factor ensuring limited political influence and the widespread marginalization of their interests.5 As a consequence, Indigenous peoples across the region entered the pandemic whilst already suffering from a range of serious economic and socio-cultural inequalities.6 Inadequate access to medical care, chronic poverty and economic marginalization, racism and prejudice, and inadequate access to education are common issues that exacerbated the impact of the pandemic.7 The World Health Organization confirmed the arrival of the pandemic in the region on February 26, 2020. [...]Indigenous mortality rates were 4.03 percent in Brazil and 19.9 percent in Mexico—significantly higher than 2.2 percent and 5.7 percent overall mortality rates in each country respectively.9 Unfortunately, the lack of regional data on, and deliberate under-reporting of, Indigenous mortality rates across much of Latin America has problematized many of the available datasets.10 In Brazil, for example, organizations such as The Articulation of Indigenous Peoples (APIB), have shown that the total number of recognized Indigenous deaths (902 persons as of April 7, 2022), undercounts the actual figure by at least 31 percent.11 Other sources, such as the Special Secretariat for Indigenous Health (SESAI), which is responsible for Indigenous medical care, also provides incomplete data on Brazilian Indigenous mortality by failing to count Indigenous urban dwellers or those who live outside of recognized government-controlled territories in their data sets.12 Such groups are among some of the most vulnerable Indigenous communities in the country, receiving little, if any, support from government agencies charged with supporting Indigenous communities.13 As a result, the scale and scope of COVID-19's impact on Indigenous Brazilians is, and for the foreseeable future will likely remain, unknowable.14 Despite a lack of adequate data across much of Latin America, a growing body of evidence indicates that Indigenous peoples were particularly vulnerable to COVID-19, and that they likely died or suffered long-term health issues in disproportionate numbers.15 In a study of Indigenous peoples in Chile, for instance, regions with larger Indigenous populations recorded a noticeable increase in overall mortality.16 Where direct data do not exist, emerging studies suggest that the medical impact of COVID-19 was likely compounded by a range of structural inequalities and environmental factors.17 Many Indigenous peoples lack access to adequate medical care. [...]disproportionate exposure to pesticides—used extensively in agricultural industries in which many Indigenous people find employment, as well as exposure to smoke inhalation—caused by out-of-control forest fires across Latin America—likely exacerbated the repertory symptoms caused by COVID-19.18 As a consequence, Indigenous peoples had to face COVID-19 not only with fewer resources, but with greater exposure to the types of pre-existing conditions known to aggravate the impact of the disease.19 Particularly high mortality rates among Indigenous elders, who act as stores of traditional knowledge, affected cultural continuity and community cohesion.20 To better understand this we spoke with a representative of the Indigenous Kaingang people, Duko Vãgfy, who explained that "[t]he worst losses [we suffered] were the elders, because they held so much knowledge about [our] people.
ABSTRACT
Returning to the world prior to March 2020, though, is perhaps more of a return to a status quo in which those occupying positions of privilege and power—particularly in the Global North—shift focus back to the conventional news cycle. Aside from early reporting on COVID-19, former President Donald Trump's first impeachment trial and reactions to the United States' assassination mission of Qasem Soleimani dominated headlines in early 2020. [...]we cannot return to holding that level of unconcern for similar violence in the United States towards historically marginalized communities like Black and Indigenous People of Color.
ABSTRACT
This paper explores editorials and opinion columns published in four Chilean mainstream newspapers and analyzes how China is represented within the context of Chinese economic advances in the region and the contextual narratives surrounding bilateral relations. Through a content analysis of editorials and opinion pieces of elite media between 2018 and 2021, this study allows an understanding of how China and its growing influence are perceived locally. Ultimately, despite an overall alignment with China's public diplomacy centered around an economiccommercial dimension, there are still nuances in how China is represented in Chilean op-eds.
ABSTRACT
The book explains the rise of BRICS as a decisive group in the present world affairs. It emphasizes the significance of Russian and Chinese foreign policies concerning the BRICS group and how these two countries are using the group to promote their national interests. It also examines the causes of close association of Russia and China within the BRICS group. It illuminates the changing political dynamics of the world. This research contains the scope to unravel the strength of BRICS and Russia and China's foreign policy strategies. The study explains the change in global politics in post covid-19 international affairs. It analyses whether BRICS has the potential to play a decisive role in emerging international politics. The methodology adopted consists of three components: Quantitative method and Qualitative method along with a field trip to Russia to conduct surveys and interviews. The approach has been analytical and descriptive, and both primary and secondary sources have been consulted. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022.